From: mkb30@cam.ac.uk (Matthew Belmonte)
To: entitlementcardsunit@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk
Subject: NO to `entitlement cards'
Date: Sun, 08 Dec 2002 22:19:21 +0000

The following is a response to the Government's consultation paper on
entitlement cards.  I am opposed to any entitlement card scheme, be it
universal (point 4 of the consultation paper) or voluntary (point 3).

I am a UK citizen and have recently returned to the UK after residing in the
United States for twelve years.  I was dismayed to discover that the Government
is contemplating a national identity card scheme, along the lines of the United
States' use of driving licences for purposes of identification.  It seems that
any assault on civil liberties that's introduced in the United States is
inevitably pushed by the Government as a good idea for Britain.  In actuality,
the example of the United States should serve as a caution to any government
considering the implementation of an identity card scheme.

It's become difficult in the United States to transact any business whatsoever
without producing a driving licence or providing a Social Security number, or
both.  As more and more banks, credit card issuers, insurers, and health care
providers have begun to key their databases on Social Security numbers, the
rate of identity theft in the United States has soared: all it takes is one
nefarious clerk with access to one of these databases, and all of a person's
history and details can be viewed.  Any identity card scheme, and particularly
one that assigns a unique identifier to each card holder (point 7), is liable
to such abuse.

The Data Protection Act would be hardly any obstacle to expanding the use of
card information by the Government (points 10 and 12 through 17), since new
uses can and will be specifically authorised by legislation.  Even if the
Government does take steps to avoid centralising the information that it holds,
information will nevertheless become linked through databases run by private
companies (points 10 and 20).  The introduction of a 'voluntary' card scheme in
the UK would thus lead inevitably to privacy breaches and crimes of identity
theft (point 11) similar to those that have developed in the United States.
The card would increase fraud, not reduce it.

I particularly object to the proposed allowance of private-sector access (point
20) to the Government's identity databases.  The fact that this access would be
based on informed consent does nothing to protect privacy: inevitably, private
companies that deliver everyday services such as credit cards and bank accounts
will make the provision of such services contingent on the customer's consent.
The only way to prevent this organised breaching of privacy is to disallow
private-sector access absolutely.  Along the same lines, the Government should
not become involved as a client with any private-sector credit reference
agencies (point 21).

I personally will never accept a universal identity card in Britain --
especially one that includes biometric information (point 28).  I do not want
shadowy agencies trading my fingerprint and iris scan behind my back.  If I
want someone to have my details, I will provide those details -- and if I
refuse to provide information about myself, I should have the right to make
that refusal.

The final insult of this proposed scheme is its cost: citizens would be
expected to fund this invasion of our privacy, to the tune of an extra £10
to £18 on every passport renewal.  I add this final insult to the list of
my objections.

Sincerely

Matthew Belmonte
[address]